Aim of the paper is to present a framework for linking the functional and the personal income distribution. In the first part the Piketty's book "Capital in the XXI Century" is briefly reviewed. Piketty's framework is discussed arguing that it can explain only partially level and changes within the personal income distribution. Piketty links in a very innovative way the returns from capital r to the rate of growth of national income g comparing them in a macroeconomic framework. He claims that when returns on capital rise more quickly than the overall economy and taxes on capital remain low, a vicious circle of ever-growing dynastic wealth and growing concentration of wealth takes place. However, the rise in the inequality of personal income distribution cannot be explained only by the rise of capital incomes. An analysis of the generation of personal incomes, and consequently of inequality, requires a suitable framework that links incomes at the macroeconomic level (national accounts) and incomes at the level of the individual/household. It is possible to build this framework starting from the individual endowments and their links to the productive structure: that is from what it can be called the "generating function of personal income". This function transforms personal endowments in personal earnings, given the productive structure, the technologies, and the market rules that determine the functional distribution. The personal income distribution and its inequality are linked to the functional one, through the shares of capital and labor owned by each individual. The framework here introduced seems to be a suitable tool for taking in account that the personal income distribution is inextricably tied up with different sources of inequality in the distribution of national income. Sources such as what comes from the institutional and productive structures (matrix Y), but also what comes from the distribution of endowments and of individual/ household entitlements (matrix S). This approach, we argue, can allow assessing and evaluating the effects of "ambitious new policies", aimed to reducing poverty and inequality ex-ante, as suggested by Atkinson in his last book.
Introduction
Inequality in income distribution has long been one of the major themes of economic and sociopolitical debate, but interest in this topic within the economic field has waned over time. GDP per capita has been widely considered to be a satisfactory indicator of economic prosperity. Having been rather neglected during the period of sustained economic growth in Western Europe and North America that followed the Second World War, the first two decades of the XXI century saw a resurgence in interest toward this issue. A very substantial body of research on inequality has been accumulated, building on the potential of improved data and focused on clarifying concepts and measures, capturing trends, and understanding the causal processes at work back and forth to the economy. The interest toward inequality in income distribution increased with the deterioration of social and economic conditions following globalization, financial crisis and unemployment. Inequality has now become the focus of remarkably wide-ranging attention, from International Institutions, Government Reports to, finally, also academic journals across a variety of disciplines. The question is 'why should economists "care' about inequality'? Equity is a fundamental value in democracies. It is connected to the functioning of the economic system (Atkinson, 1997) . Economic inequalities can be conceived of as the outcome of the underlying economic process which produce some other economic effects. Individual differences provide behavioural incentives to work, save, or take an entrepreneurial risk. Inequalities tend to be self-enforcing and self-sustaining. Inequality in one respect or for one group may hang together with equality in another respect or for other groups. Linkages and effects amongst and between inequalities are not necessarily obvious and their revealing requires analytical effort. More recently, considerable attention has been paid to the ways in which higher inequality could act as an obstacle to growth. Social protection and the Welfare State more broadly (e.g. via education and health care) can potentially provide an environment that stimulate rather than undermines economic growth. Even more important is the understanding that policies might improve both equity and efficiency simultaneously and avoid the trade-off between them. Special attention has been paid to the role of Institutions. Differences in institutions and policies are likely to play an important role in explaining the different levels and trends of wage and income inequality across countries. Inequality in the income distribution into industrialized countries is very high and increasing with the rise of income per-capita. A rise of top income inequality in the English speaking countries "and the more modest rise in continental Europe and Japan" started from 1980, in sharp contrast to the decline seen over the previous 40 years. A very recent Oxfam Reports (2016) show that we are living in an Economy for the top 1%. The wealth of the world is divided in two: almost half going to the richest one percent; the other half to the remaining 99 percent. A global network of tax havens further enables the richest individuals to hide their wealth. A forty-year trend of increasing inequality, common to many advanced economies, deserves the search of forces which are deeply rooted "within modern industrial capitalism" (Solow, 2014, p.2) . Growing inequality bring to discuss some issues as how inequality can be analyzed and what set of concrete proposals aimed at reducing it can be put forward. We can find answers and proposals in two recent books: Piketty's "Capital in the Twenty-First Century" (2014a) and Atkinson's "Inequality. What can be done?" (2015). Piketty's work is an impressive empirical research on inequality and on its persistence over time, with particular reference to the "sustainability" of capitalist systems in which inequality is increasing. An empirical analysis of inequality in wealth's and income's distribution, in the long run, was never been made before Piketty's book (Piketty, 2014a (Piketty, , 2014b , therefore, has already allowed, and will allow in the future, to promote a very rich and innovative debate. It has placed at the center of the economic and political debate the issue of inequality and of its perpetuation through generations. The functional distribution of income between capital and labor, the increase of capital share in national income and the wealth's concentration have become central issue of economic analysis as they used to be in the nineteenth century. The relationships between capital, saving and growth which are pushing toward divergence in income and wealth are well identified in a macro setting. However the personal income generating process, and its links with inequality, are not really analyzed. Piketty's framework does not allow to set out a theory of personal income distribution. As Tony Atkinson observed in a "pioneering" article (Atkinson, 1997) , the personal income distribution has been brought "from the cold" only at the end of the 90'. In his last book Atkinson (2015) brings his theoretical and practical experience to bear on the multifaced features of income inequality. He presents a comprehensive set of policies that could bring about a genuine shift in the distribution of income in developed countries. Atkinson claims that fresh ideas are needed in order to reduce inequality. It is necessary to go beyond imposing new taxes on the wealthy. His quite ambitious set of policies asks for an analytical innovative framework aimed to identify the micro and the macro variables which are sources of personal income distribution and therefore of inequality. A framework must be introduced in order to "make a link between incomes at the macroeconomic level (national accounts) and incomes at the level of the household" (Atkinson, 2009, p.1) . As Atkinson claims, the relationships between "factor shares …and inequality in the personal distribution of income … is the principal problem of political economy." (Atkinson, 2009, p. 1) . This framework can be built starting from the individual endowments and their links to the productive structure, that is from what we can call the "generating function of personal income". The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the Piketty's analytical framework. Section 3 discuss the "fundamental contradiction of capitalism", that is the inequality r > g in the long run. Section 4 analyzes the Piketty's approach as one only partially suitable to explain the inequality in personal income distribution. Section 5 introduces a framework that can link the functional and the personal income distribution. Remarks on the relevance of the proposed framework for the assessment of reducing inequality' policies conclude the paper.
The Piketty's analytical framework.
"Capital in the Twenty-First Century" provides a general theory of the functioning of a capitalist economy. Issues on inequality are only one aspect of that general theory. The setting can be called "classic" in the wake of Smith, Ricardo and Marx. However Piketty is not interested in explaining the role of capital accumulation on economic growth, but instead the inverse relation, that is the role of economic growth on the returns to capital, on the concentration of wealth and the inequality of income in capitalist economies. The forces that shape income's concentration are economic but also political and institutional as wars, taxation, and inflation (Milanovic, 2014, p. 529) . Piketty attempts to answer to some very important questions. Do the dynamics of private capital accumulation inevitably lead to the concentration of wealth in ever fewer hands? Or do the balancing forces of growth, competition, and technological progress lead in later stages of development to reduced inequality and greater harmony among the classes? (Piketty, 2014a, p. 11) . Piketty finds the answers to these questions looking to the factors which determine the accumulation of capital and the changes in the capital's and labor's shares within the national income. In a society where "patrimonial capitalism" prevails, wealth concentration mainly contributes to the inequality in the distribution of personal income. When the percentage of people who do not need to work in order to earn their living (the rentiers) will go up the distribution of personal income will become even more unequal.
The link between wealth concentration and inequality in income distribution is documented mainly by the empirical findings for the USA and for some other westerns countries. Piketty uses very simple economic models to explain what is going on. He reverses the relationship between income distribution and growth as it has been interpreted in the traditional Keynesian models. Such models explain the rate of the economic growth as a consequence of the ratio between the saving rate and the capital-output ratio. Piketty, instead, investigates how the ratio between the saving rate and the rate of growth of the economy determines the capital-output ratio, and consequently the share of capital's income in the national product. The definition of capital follows the SNA guidelines. It includes all forms of assets (housing, land, machinery, financial assets in the form of cash, bonds and shares, intellectual property) that generate a return/rent as the result of the functioning of a "pure and perfect" market for capital. Durable goods are not included. The analytical framework consists of two models: i) the first is a quite standard Harrod-DomarSolow macro model aimed at determining the capital-income ratio and the capital' income share. ii) the second model is aimed at linking the wealth' concentration to the rate of growth of r in comparison to the rate of growth of the economy g. The first model leads to the "first and the second fundamental laws of capitalism". According to the first law the capital share α on national income is linked to the capital-output ratio β and to the average rate of return to capital r (α = r x β). The capital-output ratio (K/Y), that Piketty calls β, measures the overall importance of wealth in a given society, as well as the capital intensity of production (Piketty, Saez, 2014, p. 840) . Assuming, as Piketty does, according to the standard hypothesis of perfectly competitive markets, that r is equal to the marginal productivity of capital, it decreases when β increases. In a more complex economy, where many diverse uses of capital exist, the rate of return on capital r may be higher or lower than the marginal productivity of capital. Then, it is determined by the following forces: firstly by technology and secondly by the abundance of the capital stock (Piketty, 2014a, p. 154) . Thirdly, the owner of capital which is in a monopolistic position can impose a rate of return greater than the marginal productivity of the capital itself. The central question becomes how much the rate of return on capital r decreases when the capitalincome ratio β increases (Piketty, 2014a, p.155) . This depends on the elasticity of substitution (σ) between capital K and labor L in a CES production function. The standard assumption is that the production function is a Cobb Douglas and the rate of substitution σ is equal to 1. In this case as the stock of capital rises, the rate of return on capital r decreases exactly in the same proportion, so that α does not change (Piketty, 2014a, p. 154) . If the rate of return on capital r falls more than proportionately when the capital income ratio β increases, then the share of capital's income in national income decreases. In other words, the decrease in the rate of return on capital more than compensates for the increase in the capital-income ratio. On the opposite, if the rate of return r falls less than proportionately when β increases then the capital share of income increases with β. The effect of the decreased rate of return on capital is simply to cushion and moderate the increase in α compared to the increase in the capital-income ratio β. Piketty introduces the hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution (σ) between capital K and labor L is greater than one (σ>1) so that a rise of capital income ratio β also lead to a rise of the share of capital in national income. Intuitively, it makes sense to assume that σ tends to rise over the development process, as there are more diverse uses and "forms" for capital and more possibilities to substitute capital for labor (Piketty, Saez, 2014, p. 841) . The "second fundamental law of capitalism" allows to determine the value of β in the long run through the so-called Harrod-Domar-Solow formula. The hypothesis is that capital-income ratio converges toward β=s/g, where s is the long-run annual saving rate (saving being invested in domestic or foreign assets) and g is the long-run annual total growth rate of the economy. The total growth rate g is the sum of the population growth rate (including immigration) and the productivity growth rate (real income growth rate per person) (Piketty, Saez, 2014, p. 840) . The higher the savings rate and the lower the growth rate, the higher the capital-income ratio β will be (Piketty, 2014a, p. 44) . In a stagnant economy, where the amount of capital is high, the rate of saving exceeds the rate of growth, (s>g) so that β will be high and increasing. If both α and β are increasing, also the concentration of wealth will be high and increasing. At least it is what we observe in historical series. The tendency for capital to grow faster than the economy is also more likely when the growth of the economy is relatively slow because of both demographic or technical factors. The validity of Piketty's model depends crucially on two key propositions: i) the relative stability of the rate of return of capital in the face of capital deepening; ii) a constant or rising saving ratio when the growth is slowing down. Both hypothesis could be rejected on a theoretical ground. The answer to that questions cannot be given in abstract but only looking to the empirical evidence. Piketty clearly prefers this second methodological approach. Piketty claims that capitalists save a sufficiently large share of their returns to ensure that their capital will grow at least as fast as the economy. This is especially likely to be true for the seriously wealthy, who are also likely to enjoy the highest returns. People with inherited wealth need save only a portion of their income from capital to see that capital grow more quickly than the economy as a whole. Under such conditions, wealth originating in the past automatically grows more rapidly than wealth stemming from the accumulation of work's incomes. This process tends to give lasting, disproportionate importance to wealth created in the past, and therefore to inheritance (Piketty, 2014a, p. 267) . Inherited wealth will dominate wealth amassed from a lifetime's labor by a wide margin, and the concentration of capital will attain extremely high levels (Piketty, 2014a, p. 25) . These levels are incompatible with the meritocratic values and the principles of social justice prevailing in modern democratic societies.
3. The "fundamental contradiction of capitalism". The inequality r > g in the long run. More recently, the theoretical framework, the methodological approach and especially the concept of "capital" and of "saving rate" adopted by Piketty have been challenged. French economists, especially, were critics of his approach (Aghion, 2014) . Piketty replied to the numerous and different remarks on his book writing some new papers. He argued that the arguments of the book have been "simplified in the telling and retelling" so that the original message were misunderstood. His message, however, is very clear. The factors that generate inequality in wealth and income are numerous institutional, socio-economic and demographic. The analytical model (rather mathematical in nature), that explains the relationship between the rate of return of capital, the rate of growth of the economy and the concentration of wealth, is developed in two papers subsequent to the Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty, 2015a, Piketty and Zucman, 2015) . Piketty claims that when r>g capital grows faster than the economy the concentration of capital will attain extremely high levels (Piketty, 2014a, p. 25) . Capital accumulation generates changes in the functional distribution of income in favor of capital. Because incomes from capital are more concentrated than incomes from labor, also the personal income distribution will become more unequal. This inequality is the fundamental contradiction of the patrimonial capitalism (Piketty, 2014a, p. 298) . A vicious circle of ever-growing dynastic wealth starts, which cannot be reduced by an additional level of competition. The way by which wealth is accumulated and distributed contains forces pushing toward divergence, toward an extremely high level of inequality. Piketty, however, does not claim that r > g is the only or even the primary tool for explaining changes in wealth and therefore in income inequality. Institutional changes and political shocks, which can be considered endogenous to the inequality and to the development process itself, are also very important (Piketty, 2015a, p. 48) . In the real world, many shocks to the wealth trajectories of families can contribute to make the wealth distribution highly unequal. These shocks are related to financial or estates rate of return, demographic factors, differences in saving behavior, differences in propensity to invest, differences in taste parameters, in labor market features, in the institutional and political setting. Differences in earnings to be saved and cumulated are also important shocks. Wealthier people can obtain higher average returns than less wealthy people. Unequal returns on capital, then, are a divergence force for that significantly amplifies and aggravates the effects of the inequality depending on r > g. (Piketty, 2015a, p. 50) . These shocks will ensure that there is always some degree of downward and upward wealth mobility, so that wealth inequality remains bounded in the long run. The gap between the net rate of capital's return and the rate of growth of the economy is certainly not the only determinant of a steady-state wealth inequality. It is, however, one important determinant. Piketty argues, also, that the size of the gap between r and g is one of the important forces that can account for the historical magnitude and variations in wealth inequality. "The effect of r-g on inequality follows from its dynamic cumulative effects in wealth accumulation models with random shocks, and the quantitative magnitude of this impact seems to be sufficiently large to account for very important variations in wealth inequality…Most importantly, it is really the interaction between the r-g effect and the institutional and public policy responses-including progressive taxation of income, wealth, and inheritance; inflation; nationalizations, physical destruction, and expropriations; estate division rules; and so on-which in my view, determines the dynamics and the magnitude of wealth inequality." (Piketty, 2015b, p. 75-76) . It is possible to show that over a wide range of models, the long-run magnitude and concentration of wealth and inheritance are a decreasing function of g and an increasing function of r. "Both the wealth/income ratio and the concentration of wealth tend to take higher steady-state values when the long-run growth rate is lower and when the net-of-tax rate of return is higher" (Piketty, Zucman, 2015 , p. 1343 -1344 . Under fairly general conditions, if shocks take a multiplicative form, one can show that the top tail of the distribution of wealth converges toward a Pareto distribution. This is approximately the form that we observe in real world distributions, and which corresponds to relatively fat upper tails and a large concentration of wealth at the very top. The inverted Pareto coefficient (measuring the thickness of the upper tail and hence the inequality of the distribution) increases with the gap between r and g. There is no a general reason why r − g should increase as g declines: it could potentially go either way. From a theoretical perspective the effect of a decline in the growth rate g on the gap r-g is ambiguous depending on how a change in g affects the long-run rate of return r. This depends on a mixture of forces, including saving behavior, multisector technological substitution, bargaining power and institutions. Generally speaking, a lower g, due either to a slowdown of population and/or to a productivity decrease, tends to lead to a higher steady-state capital/output ratio β = s/g and therefore to lower rates of return on capital r (for given technology). The key question is whether the fall in r is smaller or larger than the fall in g. Historical evidence and new technological developments suggest that it should increase. Low growth is inevitable once countries have reached a very high level of income. It is the "dead hand" of the past generations (high β ratio) and the high returns on capital that destroy the fabric of today's advanced capitalist societies. "The past devours the future" (Piketty, 2014a, p. 942 ).
Is Piketty's approach able to explain the inequality in personal income distribution?
Piketty links in a very innovative way the returns from capital to the rate of growth of national income. Trends of capital's rent r and of income growth rate g are compared in a macroeconomic framework. From this relation Piketty derives the value of the concentration of wealth, that of capital incomes and, finally, from the inequality in the distribution of capital income, the inequality in the personal income distribution. Piketty shows how the gap r − g is directly linked to the inverted Pareto coefficient of the wealth distribution. This point has been criticized in some of the book's reviews. Debraj Ray (2014, p. 9) argues that the inequality r > g is mainly a condition of economic efficiency. An economy where r <g is inefficient in the sense that it has been saved too much. The r>g relationship does not tell us anything more. It does not tell us anything about increasing inequalities in the wealth distribution. Only a detailed study of inheritance can enlighten us as to whether inheritances are key factors in explaining these inequalities. Also Mankiw (2015, p.43) argues that r>s is an equilibrium condition in neoclassical models. Their existence means that "we live in a world in which any dynamic Pareto improvements has been unexploited… There is, moreover, good reason to doubt that r > g leads to the "endless inegalitarian spiral" that Piketty describes... Piketty reasons that resources of the wealthy would grow relative to the labor income if r > g. We can now see, however, that this condition is not sufficient once consumption, procreation, and taxation are accounted for. Instead, to obtain the worrisome "endless inegalitarian spiral," we would need the return on capital r to exceed the economy's growth g by at least 7 percentage points per year" (Mankiw, 2015, p.44) . Piketty answers to these critics claiming that he is well aware that "the inequality r>g holds true in the steady-state equilibrium of the most common economic models, including representative-agent models where each individual owns an equal share of the capital stock….and does not entail any implication about wealth inequality" (Piketty, 2015a, p. 49) . He continues further: "I do not view r > g as the only or even the primary tool for considering changes in income and wealth in the twentieth century, or for forecasting the path of inequality in the twenty-first century. Institutional changes and political shocks played a major role in the past, and it will probably be the same in the future. In addition, "I certainly do not believe that r > g is a useful tool for the discussion of rising inequality of labor income: other mechanisms and policies are much more relevant here, e.g., supply and demand of skills and education" (Piketty, 2015a, p.48) . He goes on "the rise in labor income inequality in recent decades explains why total income inequality is now substantially higher in the United States than in Europe" (Piketty, 2015a, p.49 ). Piketty claims that his "analysis of capital and inequality is multidimensional. The two dimensions of inequality, the inequality of labor income and the inequality of capital ownership do interact in important ways: for example, rising inequality in labor earnings during a certain period of time might tend to fuel rising wealth concentration in following decades or generations. However the forces that drive income inequality and wealth inequality are largely different. "In certain societies, the top shares of income and wealth might be highly correlated, while in other societies they may represent entirely different social hierarchies (as in traditional patrimonial societies). The extent to which these two dimensions of inequality differ gives rise to different representations and beliefs systems about social inequality, which in turn shape institutions and public policies affecting inequality dynamics" (Piketty, 2015b, p.73) . A very important issue remains: how much inequality in total income distribution depends on the wealth concentration. In many passages of the book, Piketty claims that a rising share of income from capital corresponds to a higher inequality in personal income distribution. This link, however, it is not explained by an analytical framework and it deserves a deeper discussion. As Pier Luigi Porta argues (2014) "reading the Piketty's latest book is a refreshing experience. In the first place the book focuses on distribution as the main problem of Economics. This is a welcome surprise…. Piketty's analysis has been justly praised from most quarters. But he risks focusing too much on the symptoms rather than going direct to the heart of the matter and curing the illness". The question becomes: i) Is the Piketty's approach the right one to highlight the different factors behind the rising inequality in personal income distribution? ii) How to link functional to the personal income distribution? i) The passage from a macro approach (the r>g inequality) to a micro one (personal distribution) is very complex and in the Piketty's book is not really explained. Inequality in personal income distribution has grown over the last 30 years, with similar patterns for wages and capital income, driven by three dynamics: rising inequality of capital income, rising inequality of labor income (wages and compensation), increasing share of income going to capital income rather than to labor income. Capital incomes everywhere have always been and still are less equally distributed than wage income and, in the last years, the highest-income earners (1 percent) collected a disproportionate share of the growth in these incomes. A U.S. economy, driven by the interests of business and the wealthy, has generated increasingly unequal economic outcomes where the top 1 percent did exceptionally well but the vast majority did not do well at all. This phenomena is due to the unequal access to high financial returns. Large potential financial portfolios have access to substantially higher returns than smaller ones. Financial deregulation might have contributed to such an evolution. The concentration of wealth has mirrored trends in the concentration of income. Not surprisingly, the gap between the wealth of those at the top and those in the middle substantially grew over the last few decades. Moreover income from wealth is probably even more concentrated than wealth itself because, as Solow notes, "large blocks of wealth tend to earn a higher return than small ones. Some of this advantage comes from economies of scale, but more may come from the fact that very big investors have access to a wider range of investment opportunities than smaller investors" (Solow, 2014, p.10). A similar pattern of increasing inequality has been observed also in labor earnings. Labor earnings are by far the most evenly distributed sources of overall income because, after all, the vast majority of non-retired households have members that work. Yet labor earnings have become much more unequally distributed in recent decades. Some facts about the composition of top incomes deserve attention. About 60 percent of the income of the top 1 percent in the US today is labor income. Only when you get to the top tenth of 1 percent does income from capital start to predominate. This is a fairly recent development. In the 1960s, the top 1 percent of wage earners collected a little more than 5 percent of all wage incomes. This fraction has risen pretty steadily until nowadays. This rise of top labor's income it is clearly a very important historical development which can itself be explained by a mixture of factors: 1) rising inequality in access to skills and to higher education; 2) exploding top managerial compensation (Piketty, 2014a) ; 3) large cuts in top tax rates. 4) changing incentives and norms on the labor market. If the large increase in US labor income inequality in recent decades could be explained by insufficient educational investment for large segments of the US labor force, massive investment in higher education would be the right policy to curb rising income inequality. This evolution "might have been exacerbated by rising tuition fees and insufficient public investment" (Piketty, 2015, p.72) . However, although, the race between education and technology is very appealing, it cannot account for every fact. According to Piketty, the unprecedented rise of top labor incomes that has occurred in the United States over the past few decades is largely due to the rise in top executive compensation in large US corporations (both financial and nonfinancial) itself probably stimulated by changing incentives and norms and by large cuts in top tax rates (Piketty, 2014a, ch.14; Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva 2014) .
Piketty doubts that labor incomes of bankers and financiers might be determined by marginal productivity according to the level of human capital. He cites evidence to show that such top earnings depend mostly on chance events which have nothing do with the quality of the management. Their high wages are the product of a collusive agreement between themselves and the boards. The very highest income class consists, to a substantial extent, of top executives of large corporations, what Piketty calls "super managers" with very rich compensation packages (a disproportionate number of these, but by no means all of them, come from the financial services industry). With or without stock options, these large pay packages get converted into wealth and future income from wealth. But the fact remains that much of the increased income (and wealth) inequality in the US is driven by the rise of these super managers (Solow, 2014, p.10) . Of course among the members of this group "cohabit" the "coupon-clipping rentiers" and the "working rich". Essentially, the modern "patrimonial capitalism" has succeeded in spreading modest property across the entire top half of the income distribution (as opposed to top 5% in the early 1900s) and in creating high labor incomes. But the ownership of capital, often through inherited wealth, still remains crucially important. Another factor considered at the origin of the relative decrease in the share of income received by the work consists of the changes in the institutional mechanisms that regulate, in different countries, the labor market. The changes in the institutions of this market (less regulation, erosion of the minimum wage and union power, increased mobility) have accentuated the pressures toward inequality. In most countries, the union power has been weakened by the reduction in the rate of enrollment of workers in trade union organizations. At the same time the reforms made necessary by the increased international competition have contributed to the reduction of the share of income flowed to employment. The evidence is a support to the hypothesis that the internationalization of markets, including those of labor, would have favored the rise in inequality within countries. ii) In the literature the functional and the personal income distributions have always been analyzed separately and, furthermore, since the 1960s, the relevance of these issues is more and more downplayed. "Rather than an unified theory, the literature thus offers a series of building blocks with which distribution issues are to be studies…. No serious attempt at integrating them as really been made" (Atkinson, Bourguignon, 2000, p.5) . On one side, the functional distribution over the past four decades has been "explained by a Cobb-Douglas production function" (Mankiw, 2007, p.55) , losing the classic approach and weakening the link of factors shares with national income. On the other side, the personal income distribution has been analyzed emphasizing "that there is no direct link with factor shares" (Atkinson, 2009, p.4) . In the last few years, factor shares and personal income distribution are again a central issue on the research agenda. Atkinson justifies this renewed interest with three reasons: i) to make a link between incomes at the macroeconomic level (national accounts) and household incomes; ii) to help understand inequality in the personal distribution of income; iii) to address the concern of social justice with the fairness of different sources of income. "In making the link between national income and the income of the household sector, the breakdown by sources is, indeed, necessary since the different sources raise different issues… The link between factor shares and the personal distribution is more complex than in the days of classical economists for two important reasons: people have multiple sources of income … and there is considerable inequality within categories of income." (Atkinson, 2009, p. 4) .
From functional to personal income distribution: what kind of linkage?
An analysis of the process which links functional to personal income distribution requires a suitable framework. The effects of a rise of the capital income share (π) on the personal income distribution depends not only from its amount, as Piketty argues, but also from the inequality of capital and labor income distributions and from the correlation between the two distributions. In today's world, where people have both earnings from labor and from capital, all effects can be enlightened, following Atkinson (2009, p 10) , with a simple decomposition of the squared coefficient of variation V 2 . The overall inequality of total income, measured by V 2 , can be decomposed as a function of the share of capital income π, of the squared coefficient of variation of labor income 2 w V , of the squared coefficient of variation of capital income 2 k V and of the correlation ρ between wage income and capital income distributions:
(1) The equation (1) shows that "an upward trend in the share of capital income… does not necessarily lead to a rise in overall income inequality… for the right side of (1) to increase with the share of capital income" it is necessary that:
where λ is defined "as the ratio of the coefficient of variation of capital income to that of wages (i.e. λ = Vk /Vw )." The condition (2) implies that the effect on inequality of a rise in the capital share depends both on the degree of correlation ρ and of the ratio between the inequality of capital income on the labor income. In particular, if the two distributions are uncorrelated, "a rise in the capital share increases inequality where it exceeds 1/(1 + λ 2 )… (It is assumed throughout that λ is greater than 1) Where the correlation is positive, the critical value is reduced still further, and if ρ is greater than 1/λ, an increase in the capital share always increases inequality" (Atkinson, 2009, p 11) . The decomposition proposed by Atkinson became more relevant when it is considered in a more general framework able to explain how personal incomes are generated using both capital and labor in the productive sector. This means to link the personal income distribution and its inequality to the functional one, through the shares of capital and labor owned by each individual. As a matter of fact, the factors that can be considered as sources of individual incomes, in the short run, are not only the amount of the endowments (physical and human capital) but also the "ability" to transform these endowments into personal income. In the long run, the accumulation of capital/wealth (earned or inherited) plays, of course, a very important role in generating earnings, income and inequality. But it must be considered only one of the factors. The structure of the factors ownership of individuals grouped into family units, of different composition and size, determines the distribution of market incomes. The mechanisms that regulate the market distribution of income among the various units must be brought back to the variables that contribute to the "generation" of the added value of the economic system into different sectors of production, business units and workers. The ways in which the individual endowments translate into earnings depends on their prices as a result of structural and cyclical market equilibria. This process, following Dagum (1977) can be represented by a "generating function of income", that is, by a function f which ensures the correspondence between the market income ymi of each unit i and the endowments owned, given their prices. In a first very simplified specification it can be assumed that endowments are human capital c u and physical capital ck . This function, for each unit i, can be expressed as:
If the focus of the analysis, instead, is on the disposable income ydi, it is necessary to consider as a supplementary endowment the capability to obtain transfers from the government or from other subjects t ri . ydi = f (cui, cki , tri) (4) Two groups of variables, micro and macro, determinate the generating function of market income. From one side, the value of the endowments can be considered the result of the factors that determine the earning capacity of a subject such as personal abilities (innate or acquired), age, ownership of capital assets accumulated or inherited. All these, by the traditional theories which stress the influence of microeconomic variables are considered as causal factors of the personal income distribution. On the other side the ways through which resources are exchanged in the market and translated into income depends also on macroeconomic variables. In particular, the prices of the endowments synthesize the structural economic characteristics of the different markets. The capability of earning a given level of market income ym depends on the position of each unity in a specific socio-economic setting, that is on the relations between the characteristics of each subject and the productive sectors in which he operates: not only on market conditions, but also on the structure of property, the localization as well as on the legal rules and the social, cultural and religious features of a country. In a monetary economy these conditions can be expressed by a vector of prices and the final result will be a flow of earned incomes. Many factors generate a wide dispersion of personal incomes around the average values. Typical in this respect is the impact of innate ability and/or acquired through education. In a system where incomes are earned in the market, but the capabilities are enhanced by the social and economic organization, the unequal distribution of abilities tend to produce an unequal distribution of incomes, thus emphasizing the importance of factors such as the "fate" and the luck. It is often not by skill, but by luck that an entrepreneur anticipates a sudden turn in demand, or an employee invests in a specialization that tomorrow will be much in demand and very gainful. These elements of unpredictability and chance are strictly linked to the innovation process. The luck, however, has a very important role in the accumulation process of wealth and heritages, as Piketty has shown. Investment in both human capital (through education) and age are very important factors for explaining the earning capacity of the subjects, and therefore the inequality in personal income distribution. They, on the other hand, depend by factors linked to the individual characteristics (learning ability, school) as well as by the structure of the education system. Occupational choice, and the consequent social position, in turn depends not only on the level of education, but also by the family background and the paternal prestige. The middle class considers education not only as an investment in children but also as a factor that raises the access barriers to different kind of professions. The distribution of the disposable income yd, in a second step is obtained from the distribution of market income taking into account of the impact of the redistributive policies. This impact reflects the structure of the redistributive mechanisms that operate through the tax system (more or less progressive) and through the social security. Each economic unit (individual or household) according to his position within the economic system and to the interactions with the other units (enterprises, government) will contribute to the inequality in the distribution of both market and disposable income. The inequality in the market income will be higher when the ownership of capital/wealth is more concentrated, when the dispersion of wages and salaries is wider. Further the inequality will be higher when the exclusion from the market and the marginalization, that affect systematically some components of the labor force, specific industrial sectors or regions, is higher. Traditionally, the analysis of the personal income distribution considers households and not individuals as the reference units. This choice is justified by some considerations both from the methodological than by the empirical point of view: 1) some of the endowments are owned at the household level, 2) available data come generally from sample surveys conducted at the household level. For any household h, the level of income earned in the production activities (ymh), in every period, can be expressed as: ymh = f (c uh , c kh ) (5) The function f is the "household income generation function" which transforms personal endowments in personal earnings, given the productive structure, the technologies, and the market rules that determine the functional distribution. Atkinson (2015, p. 103) argues that "household income, and its distribution, derives not only on macroeconomic factors" but also on other factors that have been called "entitlement rules" by Andrea Brandolini. These rules can be defined as the "mechanisms regulating the appropriation of the output of the economy, or…as the "filter" between the production and its distribution among people" (Brandolini, 1992, p.5) The households can be classified into different socio-economic groups in order to be meaningful and homogenous from the point of view of the process of generation and distribution of income. The choice of the level of disaggregation and of the type of socio-economic groups depends above all on the goals of the researcher. Households' classification has to be chosen in accordance with the overall analytical or policy focus and to a degree that can be supported by the data (SNA, 1993; chapter XX). Many different criteria can be selected including: geographical location (e.g. urbanrural), assets (e.g. wealth, size of land holding) and the socio-economic characteristics of a representative individual (e.g. household head or principal earner). Finally, the households can be grouped according to their level of income considering income percentile groups. A suitable classification of the productive factors which make up the households' endowments, should be chosen in order to identify the different factor markets. This classification should allow catching up the effects of policies aimed to increase the level of competitiveness of the system, to promote the compliance for the rules of the labour market and to favour technological changes that "increases the employability of workers" (Atkinson, 2015, pp. 118-119) . The labor factor can be cross-classified by location (e.g. urban-rural, or geographical region), skill or qualifications obtained, employment status (e.g. employee, own account worker, employer) and by gender. This factor generates different type of labor income depending on employment status: dependent or independent. Mixed income (a category suggested in the 1993 SNA) is also frequently chosen as a category to represent the income of household enterprises (where it is difficult to distinguish the returns from labor, from the returns, from other factors) and it is also cross-classified in a similar way to labor. Generally no distinction is made between different types of capital and natural resources. The set of all household market incomes can be represented as a block matrix D. The first column shows the blocks of the income from dependent employment of each group of households, the second column shows the blocks of the income from independent employment and the third column shows the blocks of the income from capital. The blocks arise from a functional income distribution and obviously the number of the productive factors considered can be more than the three here used. In the matrix D some elements can be equal to zero when the household of the row does not have all types of income considered in the functional distribution. In order to determine the income received by each of the H socio-economic group from the factors of production, we must multiply each block of the matrix D by a unit row vector e‫׳‬nh, (Bottiroli Civardi, Targetti Lenti, 1980, pp. 712-714 ) obtaining a new matrix T with H rows and F columns (three in this case).
To assume that matrix T is the result of the product of the two matrixes S and Y, allows us to separate two components in the process of the market distribution of income to the households. This breakdown allows us to identify the different effects on personal income distribution of the changes in the market and employment structure and in public policies. First of all the income distribution is influenced by a change in the factorial distribution: this happens, for instance, when in the sectors of production the technological processes change. The income distribution can change, however, changing the distribution of human capital and of wealth in terms of the factors properties. These are macroeconomic variables out of the control of single individuals and/or household.
Concluding remarks.
Traditional redistributive policies which transform market in disposable income act, first of all, through the tax system by adopting progressive taxation not only on income but also on different types of wealth. According to some authors, like Stiglitz (2014 Stiglitz ( , 2015 and Atkinson (2015) , the sources of inequality in the industrialized countries are today so many and multifaced that traditional fiscal and redistributive policies will not go to the root of the problem. Taxation must be considered only one tool, among many others, to increase social mobility. "A well designed tax system can do more than just raise money" (Stiglitz, 2014c) , but a decrease of inequality through the increase in social mobility asks for the introduction of more radical policies (ex-ante) than the redistributive (expost) traditional ones (Atkinson, 2015) . The set of fiscal policies, suggested by Piketty's, for curbing income inequality, is the result of his model of "patrimonial capitalism". It could be very useful to introduce alternative fiscal policies because wealth is not only highly concentrated, but it is also very heterogeneous. Taxation is also needed to curb the political power of the richest. The increase of the tax burden must not be considered, as generally happens, mainly a measure of equalization, but rather as a tool to finance a significant expansion of the social security and the redistributive transfer of income and subsides. It is necessary to reform the tax system by adopting progressive taxation not only on income but also on the different types of wealth: it would be especially necessary to introduce a progressive tax on estates and inheritances and to standardize the taxation of capital worldwide. A progressive wealth tax on a global scale, based on the automatic exchange of bank information, is suggested by Piketty not only as "useful utopia", but as a proposal to think about and discuss. As Milanovic (2014, p.532) claims "one would be wrong to dismiss the proposal out of hand". Piketty's approach has a limited efficacy because it is effective only on the ex post inequality' level. Innovative and structural policies, instead, must be associated to the traditional one. "Reducing inequality is not just a matter of taxes and spending" (Atkinson, 2015b, p. 2-4) . Social security and taxation are policies aimed to redistributing income and wealth between people. They are very important to reduce inequalities in the distribution of disposable incomes ex-post, but certainly they cannot reduce inequality in the distribution of market income, namely on the ex-ante income generating process. This kind of inequality can decrease with policies aimed to change in the composition of the ownership of endowments by different group of households (matrix S). The "sharing of capital" could be one of these policies. Social mobility and better opportunities for poor people can be obtained by improving the quality of schools and easing the access to all. These policies have a positive impact on the endowment of human capital of different household groups.
Atkinson recommends ambitious new policies at least in five areas: technology, employment, social security, the sharing of capital, and taxation (Atkinson, 2015, p 15) . In our opinion, the effects of some of these policies on the personal income distribution could be better assessed and evaluated within an analytical framework which links the individual/household' market income to the functional distribution. The framework here introduced seems to be a suitable tool for taking in account that the personal income distribution is inextricably tied up with different sources of inequality in the distribution of national income such as what comes from the institutional and productive structures (matrix Y), but also what comes from the distribution of endowments and of individual/ household entitlements (matrix S).
